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LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE:  THE BENEFITS, THE COSTS, 
AND THE TRANSACTION COSTS 
REIMUND SCHWARZE†
As we learn that the danger of climate change is real and immi-
nent, we need to develop social mechanisms to redistribute the un-
even economic damages resulting from it, both nationally and inter-
nationally.  The polluter-pays principle, which is widely applied in 
environmental policy, is an immediate way to do this.  Liability for 
climate change has several advantages:  it could generate knowledge 
about the size and probability of economic damages, and it would cre-
ate institutions to minimize these costs, such as insurance.1  However, 
the liability model faces severe obstacles, in both national and interna-
tional law, as many of the other speakers in this Symposium have 
pointed out.2  The duty of care and proof of causation are corner-
stones of any system of liability.  Both pose serious barriers to claims 
for compensation in this field.  Depending on how these rules are im-
plemented, claims for climate change-related damages could become 
crushingly expensive and cause high transaction costs, as the following 
example may show. 
I calculated the potential liability in a climate damage suit for six 
randomly selected coal power plants in Pennsylvania.  To establish 
their potential liability in 2012, I added their emissions from 1992—
the year when they “knew that their behaviour (or omission to regu-
late their economies) would contribute to future damage”3—to 20064 
†  DIW Berlin and University of Innsbruck. 
1 See Adam Whitmore, Compulsory Environmental Liability Insurance as a Means of 
Dealing with Climate Change Risk, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 739, 740 (2000) (observing that im-
posing liability on emitters through mandatory insurance would likely cause insurers to 
price the harm associated with climate change using the best available information). 
2 See, e.g., David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air:  The Duty of Care in 
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1745 (2007) (“[E]ven if a causal link 
can be established between the offending action and the harm, what is the proper 
measure of the car companies’ liability in the face of multiple sources of greenhouse 
gases over an extended time period?”).   
3 Richard S. J . Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for Cli-
mate Change Damages—A Legal and Economic Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1118 
(2004). 
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and extended the trend of the last fifteen years to 2012.  I then 
weighted these emissions with a damage figure of $50 per ton of car-
bon based on a comparison of twenty-eight studies done by Richard 
Tol.5  Tol shows that the range of figures in the literature is huge—
from -$6.60 to $1667.6  He also demonstrates, with a confidence level 
of 95%, that the distribution of damage will lie below $62 per ton.7  
Compared to the controversial Stern Report, which puts the social 
costs of carbon at $314 per ton,8 the damage in this figure can be seen 
as a “conservative” estimate. 
Table 1 demonstrates that the liability for climate-related damages 
would be “crushing” if total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 
1992 were accounted for in a climate damage suit.  In three out of six 
randomly selected cases, the damage claim would exceed Exxon’s li-
ability—$2.5 billion—for the Valdez oil spill,9 one of the greatest sin-
gle damage awards in history.  Further, if we estimate the cost of at-
torneys’ fees and administration using the data of Tillinghast-Towers 
Perrin  for the U.S. tort system as a whole, we see that transaction costs 
would add up to more than $2.4 billion after only six cases!10  The bot-
4 Data were estimated from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency statistics main-
tained from 1995 through 2005.  See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Air Markets—Data 
and Maps, http://cfpub.epa.gov/gdm/index.cfm?fuseaction=emissions.wizard. 
5 See Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions:  An 
Assessment of the Uncertainties, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2064, 2073 (2005) (concluding that it “is 
unlikely that the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide exceed $50/tC and are 
likely to be substantially smaller than that”). 
6 Id. at 2068-69, tbl.2.  This extreme variance is largely due to differences in con-
sidering nonmarket effects of climate change such as habitat loss and species extinc-
tion, and also the result of using varying discount rates. 
7 Id. at 2073.  This figure uses a time discount rate of 3%, which is “close to what 
most western governments use for long term investments.”  Id. 
8 See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW:  THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at 
xvi (2007) (reporting the “social cost” of carbon emissions to be approximately $85 per 
ton of CO2, which translates to $314 per ton of carbon).  A prepublication version of 
the Stern Review is available at http:// www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/ 
stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm.  
9 In re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006).  The original damage 
award was set at approximately $5 billion ($287 million in general damages and $ 4.8 
billion in punitive damages).  See id. at 604.  On December 22, 2006, the Ninth Circuit 
cut this sum in half saying it was unconstitutionally high in light of State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  See In re The Exxon Valdez, 
472 F.3d at 623-24. 
10 See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS:  2002 UPDATE 17, available 
at https://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2003/200302/ 
Tort_Costs_2002_Update_rev.pdf (reporting that of each insured dollar spent in the 
tort system, 19% pays plaintff’s counsel, 21% is directed to administration, and 14% is 
spent on defense costs).  There may or may not be some economy of scale associated 
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tom line is that liability for climate change would be extremely expen-
sive not only in terms of insurance costs but also in terms of transac-
tion costs.  And it will be a singular occasion for unproductive rent-
seeking activities by law firms.  Exactly because the rules for account-
ability are so uncertain in this context, there is ample room for lobby-
ing and arguing before the court. 
 
Table 1:  Potential Liability and Transaction Costs  
of Climate Change Liability 
 
Power Plant Potential Liability 
Claimants’  
Attorneys’ Fees 
Bruce Mansfield  
Shippingport, PA 
$3700 million $1496 million 
Homer City  
Indiana, PA 
$3700 million $1499 million 
Hatfields Ferry 
Greene, PA 
$2500 million $1021 million 
Martins Creek  
Northampton, PA 
$726 million $294 million 
Mitchell Power Station
Courtney, PA 
$426 million $173 million 
Montour 
Montour, PA 
$34 million $14 million 
 
The sensitivity of potential liability to the implementation of liabil-
ity rules is shown in Figure 1. 
 
with large actions that reduces this number below the average figure for the U.S. tort 
system. 
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Figure 1:  Sensitivity of Potential Liability to Accountability Rules:  
Total Liability for the Bruce Mansfield Plant 
Emissions 1992 = 100%  
2  
$/tC              
50 
$ 1.5 bil.
120 
$ 8.8 bil.
Claimant’s 
Attorneys’ 
Fees
Defense Cost 
Administrative 
Cost 
Potential 
Liability 
20 
$ 185 mil. 
GHG load 1992 = 40%  Excess emissions 1992 = 5%  
$ 3.7 bil.
 
If, for example, we look at the potential liability of the Bruce 
Mansfield Power Plant in 2012 and consider its contribution to the 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere (GHG load) rather than its 
periodic GHG emissions (as in Table 1), only about 40% of its emis-
sions in the period 1992-2012 would be additive to climate change, as 
the preexisting GHG load reduces the forcing of subsequent emis-
sions.11  Its liability must consequently be restricted to the plant’s con-
tribution to the GHG load, or about $1.5 billion.  In considering the 
plant’s duty of care, we could plausibly argue:  why should the owner 
of Bruce Mansfield do more than average people in the developed 
world did in the same period to prevent dangerous interference with 
the climate?  Taking the Kyoto Protocol as a benchmark establishing a 
duty of care, the plant would be required to reduce its emissions by 
about 5%.  Hence, 95% of the plant’s emissions would not be penal-
ized under a tort system.  The plant’s expected liability would conse-
11 See Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human Influ-
ence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1358-59 (2007).   
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quently shrink to $185 million.  We could continue along this line to 
bring liability to zero when any duty of care was denied.  On the other 
hand, despite having raised the point of transaction costs, I did not 
give you the full picture.  If we add the cost of the defense and tort sys-
tem administration as a whole to any damage award the claimant 
might obtain, we could arrive at total costs for a single case of up to 
$8.8 billion.  The sum of damage costs and transaction costs per ton of 
carbon could thus range from $2 to $120 per ton of carbon, depend-
ing on how the duty of care is established, what type of accountability 
rule applies, how damages are awarded, and the size and type of 
transaction costs involved. 
Liability for climate change would heavily affect the U.S. econ-
omy.  But it would also affect economies outside the United States de-
pending on the way it is determined.  If, for instance, Kirsten Engel’s 
suggestion12 to use approved allowances from the European Union to 
judicially force a tradable permit market on “laggards” within the 
United States—be they states or firms—is adopted, we can expect even 
less liquidity and higher carbon prices in the European Union.  An-
other example is leakage.  If the United States were to establish a 
crushingly expensive regime ascribing liability to individual polluters, 
there would be a serious incentive to relocate GHG-intensive indus-
tries to countries such as China and India, which have no or almost no 
restrictions on GHG emissions and no liability for climate-related 
damages.  The bottom line is that we must consider and calculate the 
costs of a climate change liability in a global economic context. 
My final point is that I have—painfully—learned that a “grand de-
sign” is probably not the best answer to the problem of international 
climate change.  International negotiations have arrived at a patch-
work of different regimes, at different levels, geared to different sets 
of technology, which only loosely tie into the goal of the U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change to “prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system.”13  What strikes me is 
how little we have looked into the interactions of policies within this 
“patchwork design” of international climate change policy (ICCP).  
Erik Bluemel provided an interesting example of the multiple con-
12 Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Ligitation Approaches to Climate 
Change Mitigation:  Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1565-67 (2007). 
13 Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849. 
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flicts that will arise in such a regime of ICCP with co-existing seller 
and buyer liability.14  We need many more studies of this sort. 
Another example of a potential flaw in “patchwork designs” is the 
standards used to set the targets of coexisting international cap-and-
trade systems.  If liability in, say, a nuisance regime in the United 
States increases whenever Annex B countries decide to decrease their 
tolerated level of GHG emissions, we will see even stiffer political resis-
tance in the United States against any international regime of capping 
emissions than we already see without firms being held liable for cli-
mate damages at home.  This argument extends to industrialized 
countries as a whole if international liability for climate change ap-
plies.  There are many serious political and economic problems of this 
sort involved in an “entropic regime” of ICCP; thus there is plenty of 
room for future research in the law and economics of climate change 
policy. 
 
 
14 See Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex:  Competitive 
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 2040 (2007) 
(“[I]n the context of a public good, it is expected that forum shopping and regime 
linkages will serve as conduits for noncompliance.”).  
